Lessons from Ukraine
Learn from Ukraine: resilience against hybrid warfare from people with many years experience
There is nothing the EU can learn from Ukraine
The EU can learn a lot about how to counter russian hybrid warfare. Here we focus on countering disinformation: the EU is lagging far behind both what Ukraine is doing and what is feasible in view of what is necessary.
The Hybrid CoE Research Report, a joint effort between the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), focuses on Ukrainian best practices in countering disinformation, mainly in the period following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion (FSI) of Ukraine. However, many of these practices are the result of an evolution spanning the decade since the Euromaidan revolution. The report identifies the following ten lessons that the West could learn from the unique Ukrainian experience.
Here we show the summary lessons, for more information consult Kalenský and Osadchuk (2024). Comments (⌛) from February 2026.
1. Laying a solid foundation is fundamental
A monitoring system so extensive that it generates overlap is a must. Rapidly refuting the lies, debunking disinformation, and setting the record straight are necessary conditions for successfully countering the disinformation campaigns. Action of any kind should be prioritized, contemplation must not paralyze efforts to fight back, and trial and error is both permitted and encouraged.
⌛ Although the EU has a good central fact-checker in EUvsDisinfo, which maintains a database and publishes a weekly newsletter highlighting the latest disinformation trends, to our knowledge it has no infrastructure for real-time detection of and warning against concerted disinformation campaigns. Overall, EU countries underestimate the danger of disinformation compared to military threats, and institutional resources are correspondingly thin.
2. Numbers are crucial
Numbers really matter, be they human resources, financial resources, the number of different countermeasures and the various actors implementing them, or the repetition of key narratives from as many speakers as possible. Despite the fact that Ukrainians are putting far greater resources into counter-disinformation efforts than most Western countries, they understand that the aggressor still outstrips them.
⌛ The EU has found no means of combating the disinformation produced and disseminated by Russia on an industrial scale, nor even the will to act. With the possibilities offered by AI and AI agents, the problem of disinformation is becoming considerably worse. There is a lack of political will and courage to effectively regulate manipulating media and social networks and to protect citizens seeking information from drowning in a flood of disinformation with effective measures, such as scalable, automated administrative offense proceedings that sanction and curb the dissemination of false factual claims as a nuisance to the public (Jun 2020; Daum 2022).
3. Overlap is not a drawback, but rigidity is
The overlap between various monitoring, debunking, and counter-disinformation efforts is encouraged, not avoided. More actors working on the same topic means more reliable output, faster responses, and safeguards against the failure of one of them. In coordination, the loose nature and lack of formal procedures facilitates and speeds up responses.
⌛ Centralized solutions quickly become bottlenecks and are easier to attack. Bureaucratic rigidity slows down responses and becomes a security risk. What is needed are loosely cooperating structures.
4. Cherish the role of civil society
No government in the world can tackle the problem of disinformation alone. Civil society is absolutely crucial. Ukraine has shown how a vibrant, active and energetic civil society, constantly coming up with new ideas, protected the information space even before the government entered the scene, and how crucial it still is for many target audiences.
⌛ Only a few EU countries have recognized the value of civil society in the context of overall defense. On the whole, European civil societies, especially in Western and Southern Europe, are lulled into a false sense of security.
5. Preparation is essential, but not a panacea
Preparation for the conflict was vital; it is important not only to prepare contingency plans and ensure that the relevant teams are ready to act in the event of war, but also to prepare the crisis messaging and backup channels. However, plans must not become dogma; adaptability is also key. The Ukrainian example also serves as a warning, showing that despite facing a prolonged conflict, a society may still refuse to believe the worst-case scenarios.
⌛ Those who merely react are at a disadvantage. The EU is miles away from proactively dealing with the threat of disinformation. The willingness of Ukrainians to ignore the danger of the visible Russian military buildup, even after eight years of war, should serve as a warning to the EU.
6. Punitive measures are a must
It is impossible to rely only on defence and building up resilience against attacks. Punitive measures that limit the capability of hostile actors, or at least impose additional costs on their behaviour, must be part of the package. For many Ukrainian practitioners, these tools are the most important when it comes to protecting the information space against the aggressor.
⌛ Hybrid warfare is no joke, and spreading disinformation is not a trivial offense. The EU and EU countries are still reluctant to enact tough laws against individuals who exploit their position, reputation, and reach to spread hostile disinformation (Daum 2022; (NAFU) 2024).
7. Humour is a serious matter
Content generating amusement is used very deliberately by Ukrainians. Humour helps to reach larger audiences, and humorous content goes viral more often. It also helps to boost the morale of those under attack, and increase resilience to aggression in both the kinetic and the information space. And finally, it helps to impose costs on the disinformers by mocking and ridiculing them, and damaging their credibility.
⌛ Humor—especially gallows humor—is based on acknowledging the facts. Europeans have too much “German Angst” to acknowledge reality and take action. So they duck, keep quiet, and hope it will pass. This is exactly the division Putin needs to destroy and conquer Europe piece by piece.
8. Actions speak louder than words
When the atrocities reached their most horrifying level, it became impossible to use disinformation narratives to convince people about a “brotherly” Russia that attacks exclusively military targets. When Western countries took in Ukrainian refugees and started sending military and financial aid, it became impossible to successfully claim that the West had abandoned Ukraine altogether. However, audiences in occupied territories, cut off from any sources of real information, are still under threat.
⌛ The EU still makes too many nice speeches and takes too little action. This was most recently seen in the fear-driven decision, made in Russia’s interests, not to make its frozen funds available to Ukraine (reflexive control).
9. The information war is not over – and won’t end anytime soon
Despite some optimistic takes by Western commentators, no one in Ukraine would consider that the information war has already been won and that they could cease their efforts. Everyone understands that Russia’s information aggression will continue adapting to new circumstances, and that it is of the utmost importance to continue fighting against it.
⌛ Given the large sums of money Russia invests in disinformation campaigns (and agents of influence), it would be naive to believe that the information war has reached the “end of history.” It has been far too successful for that (Brexit, MAGA) and will only intensify with AI and AI agents. In light of this, Europe is not doing enough.
10. The West needs to catch up with Ukraine
When it comes to Western partners, Ukrainians would like to see them doing what Ukraine has been doing during the last decade: taking Russian disinformation seriously and actively resisting it. Concerns persist among Ukrainians regarding the success of Russian disinformation abroad. As a nation under attack, they also propose an “Information Ramstein” to provide support not just in the form of weapons but also in the information space. Ultimately, Ukrainian civil society remains reliant on support from the West.
⌛ It is also in the EU’s own best interests to take Russian disinformation seriously and take proactive measures to counter it. To do so, it needs legal foundations, institutions, money, and speed before it can engage civil society.
Da Capo al Fine